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Reviewed by Cynthia Grant Bowman
In the past three decades, a fair amount has been published about how
women are doing as law professors in the United States,1 but not so much
about other areas of the world. This book—the third in a trilogy about women
in law (the first two volumes covering women in legal practice and as judges)—
remedies that gap in the literature and does so in a very comprehensive
fashion. Its editors are all members of the pioneering generation of women
law professors, now all aged seventy-plus.2 The twenty-eight chapters cover
nineteen countries in all, extending beyond the usual United States, United
Kingdom, Australia, and Canada. Because the local authors invariably begin
with a description of the system of legal education in their countries, the book
provides a useful short course in comparative legal education in addition to a
history of the progress of women into the ranks of the legal professoriat. The
comparison goes much beyond the simple distinction between legal education
in civil and in common law systems to explore the vast array of ways in which
the legal academy is structured throughout the world, the different hierarchies
within it, varying teaching methods, and the local culture, all with the goal
of showing how they present problems for women law teachers. The volume
also includes a very informative introduction and summary of its themes by
Ulrike Schultz, although it can’t substitute for the extensive detail and thick
description of the chapters that follow. The introductory chapter also includes
a useful table of the years in which women were first admitted to law school,
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graduated, were admitted to the bar, entered the judiciary, and became law
professors in twenty-six countries.3
The book is organized under a series of themes, beginning with a section of
reports on gender in the legal academy in seven countries or regions (Germany,
the United Kingdom, Quebec, Brazil, Ghana, India, and Argentina) and
a second, somewhat similar, section detailing the history of women as law
professors in another four countries (the Czech Republic, Scotland, China,
and the Philippines). Each of these chapters typically contains a description
of legal education in the place under consideration, a history of women’s
entry into law teaching there, and a discussion of how they are faring now.
The third section discusses “firsts,” that is, the women who first broke into
law teaching in another eight countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland,
Estonia, Australia, the United States, Egypt, and Kuwait). One can get tired
of reading stories about “firsts,” but those collected here are particularly
interesting because of their diversity. They illustrate many common but also
many unique obstacles faced by women trying to enter the legal academy in a
variety of settings, some of them little studied (e.g., Estonia, Finland, Egypt,
and Kuwait).
I also found the chapter about the first law teachers in the United States to
be illuminating, although I have read a great deal on the subject. It focuses
on Barbara Nachtrieb Armstrong, who taught labor law and family law at
Berkeley’s Boalt Hall beginning in 1935 (and was a drafter of the Social Security
Act of 1934). But the author precedes Armstrong’s story by challenging her
generally accepted status as the first woman teaching law in the United States.4
She points out that the “real first” was an African American woman, Lutie
Lytle, who taught briefly at Central Tennessee College Department of Law
in 1898. In addition, Ellen Spencer Mussey and Emma Gillett taught at the
all-women’s Washington College of Law, which they founded in 1898 when
women were excluded from legal education elsewhere.
The following section, Part IV, consists of two personal narratives. The
first is by Celia Wells, who came from a working-class family in England and
taught law, often as the first woman professor, at a variety of law schools in
England and Wales starting in 1986; she relates her story to her family’s class,
cultural, and Communist political background. The second narrative is by
a Canadian woman law professor, Mary Jane Mossman, who sued Osgoode
Hall Law School in 1987 after she had applied for the deanship but was
passed over for a man. She describes both the “herculean obstacles” she faced
and the substantial hardships any woman daring to participate in a gender
discrimination lawsuit has to undergo.
Part V is titled “Feminism and the Legal Academy.” It includes a chapter
about Olive Stone, who became a lecturer at the London School of Economics
in 1950 and contributed to the reform of the law of matrimonial property; a
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chapter describing the three waves of women entering the legal academy in
Australia (1967–1987, 1988–2008, and since then); and the only other chapter in
the book about the United States other than the history of Barbara Nachtrieb
Armstrong described above. This chapter, written by Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
describes the types of feminist legal theory introduced by women law teachers,
categorizing them as formal equality, difference feminism, multicultural
feminism, and postmodern feminism. She implies that they followed one
another chronologically. I would differ with her characterization somewhat.
All of these schools of feminist legal theory, although perhaps introduced in
the order Menkel-Meadow describes, coexisted thereafter and continue to do
so, enriching one another. There are still formal equality feminists in the legal
academy. Robin West and Martha Fineman may have epitomized difference
feminism; but they are still actively contributing to feminist legal theory,
and their work has absorbed and developed in light of the contributions of
multicultural feminists. In other words, it is far from a story of one school
succeeding another; anyone teaching feminist jurisprudence in the United
States today must discuss all of these strands of theory, and more. MenkelMeadow most significantly omits the tremendous—indeed, pathbreaking—
contribution that Catharine MacKinnon has made to the development both
of feminist jurisprudence and the law throughout the entire period discussed.
Whether one refers to it as radical feminism, dominance feminism, or simply,
as MacKinnon prefers, equality theory, this school of thought has been
exceptionally influential from very early on—that is, at least since 1979, when
Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination was published—to
the present, and it deserves separate treatment.
Inclusion of this one chapter on feminist legal theory in the United States
is problematic. Because the country chapter authors do not describe the
theories women law professors may have developed in their settings, it gives
the impression that only those in the United States contributed distinctive
theories about women and law, which were perhaps exported to other settings.
I am sure this was not the impression the editors meant to give. Asking the
authors of each country chapter to comment briefly on the contributions
women law professors have made to legal theory in their own contexts might
have yielded interesting insights.
The final section of the book consists of two essays under the topic
“Reflections on Masculinities and Femininities in the Legal Academy,” both
written by British authors. I found this section somewhat less interesting
than the rest. The first chapter treads the well-trodden path of describing
law and legal thinking as inherently masculine in various aspects, the lawyer
and law professor as corresponding to a male model, and the ways in which
law school hierarchies are scaled according to gendered perceptions of what
constitutes quality. True, but not new; the title enticed me to expect more.
The second chapter describes a controversy that broke out at one English law
school over the naming of a student journal “The Reasonable Man” after the
lengthy period during which such a concept has been challenged by feminists.
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Interesting, but not, in my opinion, revelatory of deep insights, except for
providing yet another example of the persistence of opposition to women and
feminism in the legal academy.
Overall, Gender and Careers in the Legal Academy is a good example of what is
now called transnational feminism, which Chandra Mohanty describes as
follows:
This [feminist] solidarity perspective requires understanding the
historical and experiential specificities and differences of women’s lives
as well as the historical and experiential connections between women
from different national, racial, and cultural communities . . . . [It]
potentially counters [Eurocentric and relativist or postmodernist] logic
by setting up a paradigm of historically and culturally specific “common
differences” as the basis for analysis and solidarity . . . .5
In line with this goal, this book of edited chapters reveals a number of
common factors affecting women who enter the legal academy regardless of
the many different contexts in which they live. It also decenters the United
States and Western Europe as the subjects of study. There are only two chapters
about the United States; only Germany is represented from the nations of
Western Europe; and other regions of the world, as well as smaller and rarely
studied countries, replace the usual suspects (the six articles about Australia
are an anomaly).
There is almost universal agreement among the authors of the country
chapters (with the possible exception of the authors of the chapters on
Scotland and Israel) that the legal academy is an unfriendly environment
for women, one in which they find it difficult to succeed. One after another
notes that law schools are male-dominated, characterized by substantial
gender gaps in compensation, and stratified by gender both vertically (with
women at the lower ranks of the hierarchy and men at the higher ranks) and
horizontally (with women likelier to teach certain subjects, like family law and
legal writing, and men likelier to teach subjects associated with more prestige,
like constitutional law). Although these themes appear repeatedly, the way
these universals appear in particular contexts is key to understanding how to
address the problems they present. This is supplied by the thick descriptions
contained in so many of the country articles.
Women appear to have entered the legal academy in three waves almost
everywhere. The group of women who entered first often did not recognize, or
denied, gender discrimination, and they tended to ascribe their own success to
luck or to having an influential male mentor rather than to their own qualities.
Some of these women steered away from gender-related subjects and reforms
and resisted identification as feminists. Other very early female law professors,
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however, such as Inkeri Anttila in Finland,6 Vera Poska-Grünthal in Estonia,7
and Aisha Rateb in Egypt,8 became involved in major legal reforms benefiting
women, such as reform of family and property law, and advocated political
changes advantageous to women. Anttila, for example, contributed to the
development of a social welfare state in Finland.
The second wave of women entering the legal academy accompanied
historical events that opened it up. In the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Australia, for example, this corresponded to more general civil rights
revolutions, which effected legal changes facilitating women’s right to equal
access to schools and professions. In the United States, women streamed
into law schools as students, then into law firms, and later into the legal
academy as teachers after the equal opportunity initiatives in the 1970s and
1980s and the lawsuits that followed.9 In the Czech Republic and China, this
wave corresponded to the installation of communist regimes in each country
in the late 1940s. The new governments changed laws to emphasize gender
equality, made higher education free, and in many circumstances provided
child care and other social supports for women entering the workplace. In
both countries, the structure of higher education was also modified to make it
less hierarchical, doing away, for example, with the chair system in the Czech
Republic and replacing it with departments.
The third wave, in which we now find ourselves, is a kind of stalling or
backlash to this progress; several authors in the volume refer to the current phase
as “post-feminist.”10 This wave reflects the neoliberal turn taken by universities,
which has given rise to a kind of hypercompetitive “meritocracy” accompanied
by intensified demands for scholarly production and, some contend, gendered
perceptions of quality. Ph.D.s have become almost universally required for
entry-level positions. Women, although they may now succeed in gaining
entry-level positions, are still much more heavily represented on the lower
rungs of the professorial ladder and dominate nontenured positions, such as
those in clinics and legal writing programs in the United States. Positions
based on short-term contracts, without the possibility of tenure, have increased
dramatically.
The historical and cultural circumstances in which women have attempted
to enter the legal academy have been very significant causes of their failure
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to thrive in different contexts and in different ways. For example, family
responsibilities are cited everywhere as making success problematic for women,
but these differ by context. Norms of motherhood and of women’s role within
the family confront all working women in one way or another, but they present
particularly negative factors for women seeking success as law professors in
the Philippines and China. In the Philippines, motherhood is surrounded
by a culture of “marianismo,” and mothers’ working is not supported by
many husbands.11 In contemporary China, cultural and traditional beliefs
suppressed during the early years of the communist state now make it difficult
for female law professors. The traditional household division of labor consigns
most domestic tasks to women, supported by continuing cultural beliefs in
the inferiority of women and a disjuncture between their image and that of a
successful lawyer.12 Since the regime has cut back on social supports, free child
care is no longer available, making full-time work hard to manage for women
with children. Of course, this is also the case almost everywhere except in
Scandinavia and some nations of Western Europe.
A whole set of problems also arises in connection with the unique structure
of the legal academy in various countries, causing women not to thrive as
law professors. In Germany, for example, education in general remains very
classical in nature, and it requires a lengthy period of qualification to enter
the professoriat. It typically takes six years to gain the requisite doctorate
degree and an additional six years to complete the “habilitation,” both
of which require the production of 500- to 1000-page books.13 Thereafter,
positions in the academy come up infrequently; and to apply for a chair, one
must be willing to move to another university. Yet the years during which
women bear children and care for them during early childhood coincide with
the lengthy period of qualification for admission to the legal academy, and
they are typically not free to move their families at will to apply for a chair
elsewhere. Moreover, Ulrike Schultz, author of the chapter on Germany as
well as of the introductory chapter, points out that the traditional mode of
instruction, with large lectures and charismatic and authoritarian professors,
is not an ideal setting for women, who prefer smaller and more participatory
instructional settings.14
Different types of problems arise in countries where law teaching has
been considered basically part time, such as Ghana and the Philippines. Law
teaching does not pay well enough to support a family in either country, so
professors are expected to practice law at the same time. Combining both
teaching and law practice with domestic labor is very difficult and may lead
many female law graduates to choose legal practice instead, as a path in which
they can earn a higher income. (This is also true in Germany during the
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lengthy period of qualification, during which income is insecure and jobs in
public service or business settings provide better returns.15) In the Philippines,
women have come to prefer part-time law teaching because they can manage
to combine that with some private practice and not be required to fulfill the
newly imposed expectations of research and publication for full-time law
professors.16 Nonetheless, they need supportive spouses and the ability to
hire caregivers in order to succeed. Even so, part-time work is not a route to
rising within the law school hierarchy, leading authors of the chapter on the
Philippines to recommend moving away from part-time law teaching, paying
professors better, and giving them research support as well.17
Not many of the chapter authors offer specific proposals for how to change
the legal academy to make it friendlier to women. A few offer suggestions—
for example, measures to address income insecurity where law teaching is
either part time or requires an extremely long qualification period.18 Structural
reforms in the university system would clearly be of help in countries such as
Germany.19 And so would provision of subsidized child care by universities
in countries where it is not provided by the state. I believe that embracing
more realistic standards for entry-level hires in U.S. law schools would also be
beneficial. After spending a decade working full time while raising children, I
had virtually no publications when I applied for a position as a law professor.
I would never have been hired under today’s standards, but institutions took
a chance on me and colleagues helped me to develop by the time I came up
for tenure. We shall never know how many talented law teachers and scholars
have been lost when this path was foreclosed.
I do not feel sanguine that the proposals set forth in the preceding paragraph
will be effectuated very soon. This leaves me with the general conclusion with
which I have ended many articles about women and the problems they face in
various areas of life: that it will require both cultural and structural changes to
remedy the situation. In this instance, what is required are cultural changes at
the level of the family, university, and society, structural changes in law schools,
and major political changes to provide family support systems. After thirtythree years of teaching law, I must confess to being out of ideas about how
to change the masculine culture of law schools, except to hire more women
and get them into positions of power. I used to think that when older faculty
retired, that would solve the problem, but I am no longer so sure; I encounter
younger male colleagues who share many problematic attitudes with previous
generations.
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Things have definitely improved since 1988 when I began teaching, but
inequities remain. In 2020, more than half of law students in the United States
were women.20 Although this has been so for quite a while, the percentage
of women law professors reported at some 200 U.S. law schools in 2020
varied from 22.9% to 64.9% (at CUNY School of Law), with the majority
falling in the thirtieth and fortieth percentiles and the percentages at the most
prestigious law schools in the low thirties (e.g., ranging from 31.2% at the
University of Chicago to 35% at Yale, with Harvard in the middle at 33.1%).21
The American Bar Foundation’s After Tenure report stated that about 28% of
senior professors in 2007–2008 were women, and many of them expressed
complaints about being overburdened with committee work and advising and
being denied various benefits given to male faculty.22 By 2016, 30% of the deans
at ABA-approved law schools were women, double the number in 2006.23 So
some things are gradually changing, although we have not achieved genuine
equality and it will take a long time to reach it at the current pace of change.
Although salaries are notoriously secret at private law schools (information
about them is available at public universities), recently a number of courageous
women law professors filed complaints with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, alleging that they were paid less than their male
counterparts. After investigation by the EEOC, the complaints then went to
federal court.24 Most of these suits were settled. But we now know that it is
not uncommon to pay women anywhere from $20,000 to as much as $80,000
less than men at the same rank. A recent study based on reanalysis of the raw
data from the After Tenure project confirmed that tenured women receive lower
compensation than male law professors, even after controlling for a variety of
factors, such as their credentials; the gap was even wider for women of color.25
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Reports of “tenuring gaps” by gender in law schools have also surfaced.26
Women of color have a particularly difficult time being both hired and
promoted.27 They also face unique obstacles and stresses in the legal academy.
One study based on interviews with ten prominent African American women
law professors revealed a hostile environment, including presumptions of
their incompetence by both students and fellow faculty, which made them feel
disempowered and marginalized.28 Although women made up 51.8% of all new
hires in 2007–2008, they held a lopsided 59.5% of non-tenure-track positions,
without job security and often at lower pay.29 Women are concentrated in legal
writing, clinical, and professional skills training, and those positions are not
given the prestige or the pay they deserve.30
I want to close by returning to the claim made repeatedly by authors in
this volume that we are in a new phase of discrimination against women law
professors, one caused by changing conditions in universities and law schools,
changes in line with a neoliberal corporatization of the university. Just as
women were finally being allowed in, the rules changed. Law firms also made
similar changes after women broke down the doors that previously excluded
them—lengthening billable-hour expectations, for example, so that sixty and
more hours per week are required to fulfill them, making work at a corporate
law firm exceedingly difficult to combine with the family responsibilities many
women shoulder.31 This was a general secular change, of course, so can one call
it discrimination? I think so. First, I would note that the general neoliberal
model for economy and society is in fact patriarchal. It assumes that workers
will be able to give up to 24/7 to their work life, tolerate changing hours from
day to day, and move when the employer’s needs require. Just as Catharine
MacKinnon pointed out long ago, the ideal worker in our society is a man.32
That worker requires a wife, one who can take care of all the tasks required
for everyday life as well as care for both the older and younger generations.
So even if this discrimination was not conscious or intentional, it has had a
disparate impact on women. The effect has been a stalled revolution on the
road to women’s equality.
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Is this a result of a backlash against the many gains women had made in
attaining access to the public sphere, a reflection of a sense of threat by those
who fear being displaced? One cannot escape comparison to the antiracist
revolution, which has essentially stalled since the civil rights movement and the
achievement of formal legal equality half a century ago. With minor advances
and less overt discrimination, African Americans are still largely segregated in
housing, education, occupations, and income class. They are also subject to
lethal violence by the police. Many interpret the excessive violence of recent
racist movements as a sign of white men’s fear of being displaced.33 Maybe the
resistance of male law professors is similar.
I see the race and gender discrimination that persists in the legal academy
today more as a continuation than as a backlash or a phase. With respect to
gender, the disclosures of the #MeToo movement have startled me with their
extensive depictions of a strand of deep and continuing misogyny, not only
in the United States but in most countries of the world. Misogynists, like
racists, use whatever tool is at hand to protect their dominant position and
their power. So I am less optimistic than others may be about transforming
the legal academy or any other institution into a genuinely equal environment
for women and minorities until much broader social and economic changes
occur. Law schools exist within our society and are constrained by economic
pressures within it. Incremental changes may occur, largely when women in
power demand them, but we should not expect genuine equality until and
if much broader transformations occur in our society and economy. Thus
I remain a long-range optimist about equal status for women in the legal
academy, but a short-run pessimist.
Gender and Careers in the Legal Academy provides a valuable resource for anyone
wanting to explore these questions. It is certain to become an important
reference for understanding the unequal position of women law teachers
throughout the world. For many countries, such as Estonia and Kuwait, this
may be the only source of information on this topic. Yet unless we understand
this phenomenon, both in its diverse localized manifestations and the deeper
underlying forces that may be common in many different contexts, we cannot
work intelligently and effectively to change it.
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